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Abstract 
Human-machine interaction (HMI) has become an 
essential part of the daily routine in organizations. 
Although the machines are designed with state-of-the-
art Artificial Intelligence applications, they are limited 
in their ability to mimic human behavior. The human-
human interaction occurs between two or more 
humans; when a machine replaces a human, the 
interaction dynamics are not the same. The results 
indicate that a machine that interacts with a human 
can increase the mental uncertainty that a human 
experiences. Developments in decision sciences 
indicate that using quantum probability theory (QPT) 
improves the understanding of human decision-
making than merely using classical probability theory 
(CPT). In this paper, we examine the HMI from a QPT 
perspective.  Applying QPT to studying HMI for 
decision-making shows improvement in understanding 
the decision process when interacting with machines 
because it provides insights into the mental 
uncertainty of a human that is not apparent in CPT.   
1. Introduction
The advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and
machine learning (ML) have created and will continue 
to create fundamental shifts in human decision-
making. Although there is considerable evidence 
supporting the advantage of AI/ML-based systems for 
decision support [1], in certain situations interacting 
with a machine can inadvertently affect the human 
decision process. 
According to the national intelligence institute 
report, there are two types of AI, Artificial General 
Intelligence (General AI) and Artificial Narrow 
Intelligence (Narrow AI) [2]. General AI is known as 
a system that can handle memory, learning, 
abstraction, and creativity. Since General AI is not 
feasible soon, the limitations of narrow AI systems on 
human behavior must be comprehensively studied due 
to the limitations of CPT. Narrow AI is a system that 
is specialized for single purposes and cannot be 
generalized, and this limits studies on multi-purpose, 
multi-agent situations. Narrow AI is the standard 
approach and is built as an optimizing machine [3]. All 
of the most remarkable advances in AI applications 
use narrow AI [2]. These systems may be large and 
complicated and are considered closed systems.  In 
situations where HMI is prevalent, it is considered 
complex and an open system. As a result, an AI-based 
system that interacts with a human cannot adapt to the 
mental states or choice behavior of a human as humans 
adapt to other humans [12]. Since probability theories 
play a significant role in designing and developing 
narrow AI systems [4], their limitations can be better 
captured by understanding the limitations of the 
utilized probability theories. These narrow AI/ML 
applications are based on the Kolmogorovian 
probability theory, also known as classical probability 
theory (CPT). 
In this paper, we investigate the human-machine 
interaction (HMI) by using a more comprehensive 
approach to model human behavior, called quantum 
probability theory (QPT) [5]. By using QPT [5]–[7], 
we first model human-human interaction while two 
humans exchanging information; then apply this 
model to a scenario in which a human reads online 
medical information and compare the results in the 
case of the same human visiting a doctor. 
1.1 Human-machine interaction (HMI) 
HMI refers to a rationalization of relevant attributes 
and categories that emerge from the use of 
computerized machines. Along with the human factors 
line, this rationalization is drawn by physical (e.g., 
human-body related factors), cognitive (e.g., 
workload), and emotional (e.g., motivation) factors 
[8]. Cognition in the HMI is centralized within 
software due to its role in automation how it mediates 
most of the tasks. This allows us to interact with 
machines through software to execute a task. Within 
that interaction, task factors are crucial because the 
task is organized, supported by the machine, and 
executed by the human user [9]. This execution is 
called activity which is the process of the human 
becomes aware of the environment by acting on it and 
by transforming it. The interaction with the 
environment in which the user and machine are also 
important because it influences the task user and 
execution; hence, the process of activity (i.e., 
execution) is linked to environmental complexity [8]. 
The current HMI mostly considers explicit 
communication. In this study, we will examine the 
interaction dynamics between a human and the online 
medical content by considering relative and implicit 
information gain by capitalizing on decision-making 
theories. 
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Decision-making refers to identifying and 
choosing options by comparing with alternatives 
based on the values and preferences of the decision-
maker in an interactive task environment [10]. 
According to Baker et al. (2001), decision-making 
should start with the identification of the decision-
maker(s) in the situation, reducing the possible 
disagreement and uncertainty about problem 
definition, requirements, and goals [11]. For instance, 
a human with medical complaints can visit a doctor 
and have the doctor diagnose the problem. By 
interacting with a doctor, the patient communicates 
explicitly with the doctor; therefore, all symptoms will 
be discussed and categorized. This interaction allows 
the human to develop coherent rationales and opinions 
by directly communicating with the doctor; hence, this 
decision process involving agent interdependency. 
On the other hand, reading online medical 
information and learning more about the symptoms 
involves more implicit communication because in this 
situation, neither the patient nor the webpage can make 
any explicit categorization of the symptoms (i.e., no 
explicit communication, no test results) and each 
missing categorization of the symptoms continue to 
influence the final decision. Although a more 
sophisticated AI-based machine could better assist a 
human and adapt to the questions that are asked by the 
human and since this can only be a narrow AI, an 
interdependent decision is not plausible for a machine; 
therefore, the interdependency that is observed in 
human-human interaction cannot emerge in HMI, and 
the ensuing decisions become individual. 
Traditionally, HMIs are typically modeled with the 
rules of CPT, involving two utility-maximizing agents 
[12]. However, in the case of having heterogonous 
agents, the differences that stem from relative 
information gain can complicate decision outcomes 
because, for a machine, the utility for two is not 
attainable  [3]. In this paper, we use quantum decision 
theory  [6], [13], [14] to understand the implications of 
HMI in the decision-making process. The findings of 
this paper are based on an interaction that occurs 
between a human and computer software, which 
represents the machine. 
We address the following two research questions: 
(1) What is the interdependency relation between 
information exchanging agents due to the relative 
information gain? (2) How can the human decision 
process be expressed probabilistically by using QPT 
when there is at least one non-human information 
source? 
We hypothesize that due to the situational relations 
between information exchanging human agents if a 
machine/computer replaces one of the humans, the 
uncertainty during the decision process that humans 
experience (because of the mental indecisiveness) 
increases. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we 
discuss the two types of probability theories, i.e., CPT 
and QPT. Then we elaborate on the double-slit 
experiment in physics and how it can be used to model 
human decision-making.  Next, we explain quantum 
decision theory and interdependency in decision-
making between agents that exchange information. 
Finally, we discuss the application of the quantum 
decision theory and how that can elucidate arising 
anxiety while searching online information by using a 
case discussed in the book, The Cyber Effect [15].  
 
2. Probability theories  
 
2.1. Classical probability theory 
 
If P and N are two independent events, the 
probability they both occur is the product of their 
single-event probabilities, p(P and N) = p(P) ∙
p(N). When events become dependent events, the 
probability of event P happening affects the 
probability of event N. The “and” rule for dependent 
events is expressed as:  
 
p(P and N) = p(P ∩ N) = p(P) ∙ p(N|P). (1) 
 
The standard logic [4] with set theory principles 
indicates that p(P and N) = p(N and P). The set 
theory principles also require that the probability of 
the conjunction (intersection) of two events, p(P ∩ N), 
must be less than or equal to the probability of single 
events: p(P ∩ N) ≤ p(P), p(N). Also, the set theory 
principles require that the probability of the union of 
two events must be greater than or equal to the 
probability of single events: p(P ∪ N) ≥ p(P), p(N). 
The decision models that capitalize on CPT rules 
suppose that there is always a definite mind state for 
decision-makers; the evolution of system state is 
assumed to be happening from one state to another 
(Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Mental system representation with CPT 
modeling. The primary assumption is that the system 




2.2 A CPT violation example: The sure-thing 
principle 
 
The sure-thing principle is one of the principles of 
rational decision-making [16], and it states that “if the 
alternative A is preferred to the alternative B, when an 
event E1 occurs, and it is also preferred to B, when an 
event E2 occurs; then A should be preferred to B, when 
it is not known which of the events, either E1 or E2 has 
occurred. This premise is derived from the rules of 
CPT, and violation of the sure-thing principle is 
known as the disjunction effect that violates the union 
probability p(A ∪ B) ≥ p(A), p(B) rule of CPT. 
According to rational decision-making principles, the 
sure-thing principle must always be satisfied in 
empirical tests. However, systemic violations of this 
principle have been observed in experiments  [5]–[7]; 
CPT rules fail to explain these systemic violations, 
whereas QPT coherently explains the sure-thing 
principle violations [5]–[7]. 
 
2.3 Quantum probability theory 
 
The paradoxes similar to the sure-things principle 
are observed when a joint mental representation of 
events may not be formed [5]–[7], [17]. In this type of 
situation, the axioms of CPT, (e.g., commutativity 
transitivity axioms), limit the cognitive models. QPT 
has been introduced to decision sciences and 
successfully explained the majority of the paradoxical 
findings that CPT fails to explain [5]–[7], [17]. QPT 
removes some strict axioms of the Boolean logic that 
form the foundations of CPT. It replaces the set logic 
with the logic of the subspace. In QPT, events are not 
always commutative, which means  p(B∩A) ≠ p(A∩B) 
is supported [5].  
When events are incompatible, a joint mental 
representation of the events may not be formed. Events 
can become incompatible when 1) information sources 
have different views; 2) the perceiver lacks the 
knowledge or experience to evaluate an event. Under 
these conditions, the event is evaluated by evoking an 
incongruent perspective [5]. Since QPT uses a 
projective probability; hence, incompatible events can 
be studied in a probabilistic framework.  
 In QPT, events are represented as subspaces in 
Hilbert space (Figure 2). For example, a system, S, can 
be represented by two bases, P and N, which are the 
subspaces of a two-dimensional Hilbert space. The 
cognitive system S is represented as the superposition 
of the subspaces P and N, |S⟩ =  a|P⟩ + b|N⟩; in this 
equation are complex numbers; they form the 
foundation of the probability calculation in QPT. The 
probability of a decision, P, is calculated by projecting 
the cognitive state vector |S⟩  on the subspace |P⟩. A 
projection operator can be written as PP = |P⟩⟨P|. If PA 
operates on a superposition vector PP|S⟩ =
|P⟩⟨P|(a|P⟩ + b|N⟩) = ⟨P|a|P⟩|P⟩, the inner product 
is ⟨P|N⟩ = 0 because of the orthogonality; the 
probability of event P is calculated as p(P) =
|⟨P|a|P⟩|2 = a2.  
 
 
Figure 2 Hilbert space representation of decision 
outcomes P and N. Time evolution of the amplitudes’ 
changes is expressed with unitary transformation. 
Due to the unitary evolution, the angle 𝜃 changes and 
results in temporal oscillation (shown in Figure 3). 
The probability of a decision P at time t is calculated 
with the amplitude square, 𝑎2. 
Critical for QPT is, introducing the superposition 
principle into the decision modeling. As shown in 
Figure 3, the superposition principle indicates that a 
definite decision state does not exist in the human 
mind [5], [7], [18]; instead, there is a superposition of 
states that evolves temporally with unitary evolution 
(shown in Figure 3) [5], [7], [18].  
  
Figure 3 Representation of decision outcomes with 
superposition in Hilbert space and resulting temporal 
oscillation. 
 
2.4 Double-slit experiment 
To better understand the difference between the 
CPT and QPT, the double-slit experiment can be 
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examined with both approaches. As shown in Figure 
4, an electron is fired towards a metal sheet that has 
two slits on it. The slits are close to each other such 
that electrons can pass through the slits and then be 
detected on the screen [19]. When both slits are open, 
and no detector is placed on any of the slits, an 
interference pattern is observed on the detector screen; 
if a detector is placed on any of the slits and detects an 
electron or one of the slits is closed, the interference 
pattern on the screen vanishes. 
 
 
Figure 4. Double Slit Experiment with an electron 
gun 
Now suppose slit two in Figure 4 is closed, and 
electrons can only pass through slit 1. If the state of the 
electron is |ψ1⟩, then the probability distribution that 
the electron is detected on the detector screen at 
position x is P1(x) = |⟨ψ1|x⟩|
2 where |x⟩  represents 
the state vector of x. If the state of the electron is |ψ2⟩, 
then the probability distribution becomes P2(x) =
|⟨ψ2|x⟩|
2 [19]. 
In the case of having both slits are open, electrons 
can pass through any of them. If the electron goes 
through the slit 1 or 2, then the probability distribution 
for the electron on the screen becomes P1(x) for the 
electrons passing through slit 1 and  P2(x) for the ones 
passing through slit 2. Suppose half of the electrons 
pass through slit 1 and the other half through slit 2, the 









After passing the metal sheet with slits, the electron 
is in a mixture of two states, |ψ1⟩ and |ψ2⟩, and 
Equation 5 represents the probability distribution for 
the electron. When the electron reached the detector 
screen, the probability distribution for being in the 
state |x⟩ is [19] 






P2(x) = P(x)(6) 
 




(|ψ1⟩⟨ψ1| + |ψ2⟩⟨ψ2|) (7) 
 
If Equation 7 is used to represent the state of the 
electron mix, the interference pattern on the detector 
screen cannot be explained because the actual state of 
the system is in a superposition [19] :  
1
√2
(|ψ1⟩ + |ψ2⟩) (8) 
If Equation 8 is used, it accounts for not having any 
detection on any of the slits. The total probability of 











The interference term in Equation 9 can be either 
negative or positive, and explains why Ptot(x) ≠ P(x). 
This situation changes if a detector is placed on either 
of the slits in Figure 4 to measure if an electron passed 
through the chosen slit; the interference term in 
Equation 8 vanishes and Ptot(x) = P(x) [19]. 
 
2.5 Double-slit experiment in a decision-
making context 
 
Suppose Alice, a human decision-maker, and 
iDecide, an AI decision support tool, are on duty for 
an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(ISR) mission. The ISR mission is to monitor a group 
of aliens on a far distant planet on which the U.S. 
Space Force’s (USSF) ground units conduct an 
operation. According to the intelligence report, there 
are two categories of aliens on the planet, “Beko” and 
“Keko”. A category “Beko” aliens are more likely to 
attack the USSF ground units, where “Keko” aliens are 
more likely to be friendly to the USFF ground units. 
The mission is to notify the ground units as early as 
possible of alien presence types so that ground forces 
can either withdraw “Withdraw” or attack “Attack” 
based on the type of approaching alien.   Making the 
task more difficult is the aliens’ cross-categorical 
facial features; their images can generate bistable 
perceptual stimuli; ergo, “Beko” could look like 
“Keko” vice versa. To complete this mission, Alice 
and Bob can interact via a platform, which includes a 
common operating picture (COP). iDecide provides 
recommendations on “Beko” and “Keko” to aid in 
making her decision to have the ground forces 
withdraw or attack.   Alice interacts with iDecide using 
a common operating picture that provides situational 
awareness and information about Beko and “Keko,” 
however interactions with ground forces are directed 
by Alice and do not require interaction with iDecide. 
x 
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Two scenarios are introduced. In Scenario-1, Alice 
decides, without interacting with iDecide or the COP, 
to instructs ground forces to withdraw, as shown in 
Figure 5a. In Scenario-2, Alice, based on the COP and 
s feedback based on iDecide inputs, identifies a Beko 
alien presence and instructs the ground forces to 
Withdraw, as shown in Figure 5b. The difference 
between these two scenarios is that in Scenario-1, 
Alice maintains her indecisiveness concerning the 
category of the approaching alien (as in the case of 
having both slits are open in the double-slit 
experiment); in Scenario-2, she makes her choice and 
resolves the indecisiveness concerning the category 
choice (as having a detector on one of the slits in the 
double-slit experiment). 
These two decision processes have been tested 
through numerous studies demonstrating a systemic 
violation of the total probability for the condition in 
Figure 5a as it occurs in the double-slit experiment. 
This violation is due to the mental indecisiveness 
(ontic uncertainty) [20] that influences the subsequent 
decision in Figure 5a but does not influence the 
decision in  Figure 5b because the superposition state 
(as explained in Equations 8 and 9) concerning the 
category is resolved and hence the mental (ontic) 
uncertainty is resolved by making a category choice.  
 
Figure 5. Path diagram representations of two 
decision scenarios: (a) the condition in which there is 
no observation, and the choice of outcome is “W”; 
and (b) the path that is taken is known, and the choice 
of outcome is “W.” 
There are always ontic and epistemic aspects of a 
system in any situation. Ontic states of a system are 
referents of individual descriptions of a system [21]. 
Epistemic states of a system describe the others’ 
knowledge of the system's properties. These two states 
give rise to different types of uncertainty, ontic and 
epistemic. Epistemic uncertainty can be resolved by 
obtaining more information about the system [20]–
[22]. However, no extra information can be obtained 
to reduce ontic uncertainty; it can only be resolved 
when the system interacts with the environment [20].  
The distinction between the two can be articulated by 
re-visiting the ISR example. In Figure 5a, Alice is in 
an indefinite mental state, neither “Beko” nor “Keko,” 
concerning the category of alien. Due to her indecisive 
mental state, Alice experiences a mental (ontic) 
uncertainty concerning the category of the alien. This 
mental uncertainty can only be resolved if Alice makes 
her choice of alien category. Therefore, in the case of 
Figure 5a, since the ontic uncertainty is not resolved, 
it influences her subsequent decision. In Figure 5b, 
since the mental (ontic) uncertainty is resolved 
concerning the alien’s category, the influence that 
occurs in Figure 5a vanishes. Typically, the effects of 
an interaction between Alice and Bob are scrutinized 
at the epistemic level. However, even though a 
decision, judgment, choice, communication, or 
selection of one alternative over another can allude to 
different meanings, each of these acts should be 
considered as an interaction between a human, 
machine, and the environment. Each interaction alters 
the human cognitive system as a constructive process.  
 
3. Quantum decision theory and relative 
information gain 
 
We used the quantum decision theory (QDT) 
introduced in [6] in the human-machine interaction 
model such that some of the aspects of ontic 
uncertainty can be captured. The mathematical 
structure of QDT captures the interference term that 
results from the superposition of composite situations 
that involves contextual effects, non-commutative 
subsequent decision making, and interference effects 
[6]. 
Suppose there are two decisions to choose, D1 and 
D2. According to QDT, the probability measure of 
choosing D1 for jth as a function of  time can be 
expressed as: 
pj(D1, t) = fj(D1, t) + qj(D1, t) (10) 
 
Where f(D1) is the utility factor representing the 
classical probability contribution and q(D1) is the 
interference term. The interference term is constrained 
by the quarter-law and therefore, the non-informative 






  [6], [13], [14], [23], [24]. The sign of the 
interference term depends on the decision being 
attractive or repulsive in the situation [13].  
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In the rest of the paper, the utility factor, fj, will be 
treated time-independent [14] and the quantum 
interference term depends on the information received 
by the agent j, Mj(t): 







In Equation 11, μj represents the information gained 
by a decision-making agent. In the case of two agents 
exchanging information, the information gain of the jth 










In the case of having two alternative decisions, the 
information gain function shown in Equation 12 
becomes 
 
μij(t) = pi(D1, t) ln
pi(D1, t)
pj(D1, t)





Then, by using pi(D1, t) + pi(D2, t) = 1, one can 
rewrite Equation 13 as: 
 
μij(t) = pi(t) ln
pi(t)
pj(t)





3.1 Online medical information search: A 
case for human-machine interaction 
  
A story from The Cyber Effect [15] demonstrates the 
current state of human-machine interaction study. The 
story introduces Lisa, who went hiking with her friend 
during tick season as she and her friend were hiking 
and talked on various topics to include ticks and Lyme 
disease. Upon returning home from her hike, she 
became worried about ticks.  After a personal 
examination, she finds a tick; she removes it with the 
information she obtained online. After removing the 
tick, she began searching the internet about Lyme 
disease and its symptoms based on her previous 
discussion with her friend during their hike. While 
trying to remain calm, she clicked from one search 
result to another, and after visiting various web pages, 
her anxiety increased. Stressed out and unable to sleep, 
she decided to continue her reading more about Lyme 
disease. Click after click as she tumbled into the 
medical webpages, and while she was reading about 
the consequences of Lyme disease, her anxiety was 
high. Lisa lost track of time, and her imagination ran 
wild, often missing relevant information during her 
searches that might have been comforting. Based on 
her frenetic searches, Lisa started to think that she had 
Lyme disease and ended up visiting a doctor in the 
morning.  The doctor confirmed Lisa did not have 
Lyme disease but incurred costs for the unnecessary 
visit and contracted a virus from another patient who 
was visiting the same doctor’s office [15]. 
Lisa's story’s similarities with Alice and iDecide 
decision scenarios are as follows. To decide Lyme 
positive, there are symptoms (e.g., having red eyes) 
that need to be categorized. While searching online 
medical information about Lyme disease, Lisa could 
not make any decision for the intermediate symptoms; 
for example, during her internet searches, Lisa 
observed her eyes had become red, the red-eye 
symptom could be due to extended screen time she had 
while searching in the dark.  However, in spite of this 
context, it was instead interpreted as a result of the tick 
bite. As a result, the mental indecisiveness concerning 
the symptom categories influences her Lyme positive 
belief. 
However, after visiting a doctor, Lisa would learn 
the definite category choices for intermediate 
symptoms from a professional with the supported test 
result, and as a result, she would resolve her 
indecisiveness concerning the symptoms and would 
have a Lyme negative belief that couldn’t be 
influenced by any mental indecisiveness concerning 
the intermediate symptoms.  
.  
 
3.2 Relative information gain between agents 
 
Before the internet era, Lisa would have gone to a 
doctor if she did not feel well. During the visit, the 
doctor would ask questions concerning her health; 
Doctors have the training to make diagnoses and ask 
questions in a non-directive way [15]./ In contrast, a 
medical webpage is designed to provide information 
to the consumers but not make diagnoses.. As it 
occurred in Lisa’s situation, due to the increased 
anxiety, the terms that are entered into the search 
engine would become more Lyme-related; thus, the 
engine would continue to recommend more web pages 
that contain Lyme disease information.  
To model Lisa’s situation as an interaction, first, 
we assume that humans interact with two types of 
machines. This includes the search engines she used 
and the web pages that are recommended and clicked 
by her. Due to the nature of interaction and rising 
anxiety, in our model, the information provided by the 
visited webpage at time t has a higher weight in Lisa’s 
memory than the earlier ones. Hence, the total 
received information by Lisa in the exponential power 
term in Equation 11 becomes:  
Page 7612





In the case of having two human agents exchanging 
information, Equation 10, probability of choosing 
decision D1, becomes  
pj(t + τ) = fj + qj(t) (16) 
  
Where the τ in Equation 17 is taken as 2.5 seconds in 
the model.  
In the case of replacing one of the humans with an 
inanimate agent, the model’s assumptions are as 
follows. Lisa’s utility factor, fj, is time-independent, 
and the interference factor, qj,  is time-dependent; 
therefore, the probability equation is still time-
dependent. Since search engines are optimized to find 
the most relevant web pages that can provide more 
information relevant to the terms that are searched, we 
suppose that there is no memory contribution for the 
inanimate agent and the interference term is zero, qj =
0, and the utility factor is time-independent. 
To express the content of a medical webpage in 
terms of probability measures, the model’s 
assumptions are as follows. First, we assume that if a 
textual/semantic analysis of a medical webpage is 
conducted, a probability value can be assigned to the 
Lyme positive or negative; for example, probability of 
Lyme positive 0.7 means that the content of this 
webpage conveys information such that after reading 
the web content, the reader would think that he/she 
was 70% Lyme positive. Two types of probability 
calculation are used to model the inanimate agents’ 
role in information exchange. The first probability 
value is time-invariant, which means that based on 
search entries, all the recommended medical pages’ 
content has a Lyme positive probability value of 0.7. 
The second probability calculation, shown in Table 1, 
has a small random variation; as more search terms are 
entered, the search engine pulls information from 
various resources, and the probabilistic variation of the 
meaning of the text is ±0.01. 
The initial value of the interference term is  qj =
0.20 for two reasons. First, a positive value is chosen 
because Lisa thought that she had Lyme disease and 
began searching for information about Lyme disease 
by using a search engine; therefore, the positive value 
indicates that she was attracted to any Lyme disease 
information. Second, due to the quarter limit [6], 
[13], [14], [23], [24], to avoid a very strong 
attraction, q = 0.20 is chosen.  
 
Table 1. Initial Values for the two human-machine 
cases. 
Term Case 1 Case 2 Random  Δ = 0.01 
pmachine 0.70 0.7 0.7 0.7±Δ 0.7±Δ 0.7±Δ 
phuman 0.85 0.86 0.89 0.85 0.86 0.89 
fmachine 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 
fhuman 0.65 0.66 0.69 0.65 0.66 0.69 
qmachine 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
qhuman 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
 
3.3 Case 1: Time-independent machine 
probability 
 
To calculate Lisa’s relative information gain, Equation 
14 is used, and the webpage’s relative information 
gain is zero. Lisa’s initial probability of Lyme positive 
belief is 0.85, and the probabilistic value for the 
content of the webpage is 0.70. With these initial 
values, Lisa’s belief does not demonstrate any 
temporal oscillation at the beginning and decreases; 
however, when the difference between two probability 
values becomes less than 0.10, a temporal oscillation 
begins in Lisa’s belief, as shown in Figure 6. After an 




Figure 6. Temporal oscillation of probability of 
Lyme positive belief for Lisa; the initial probability is 
0.65. 
When Lisa’s initial probability Lyme positive belief 
becomes 0.86, the temporal oscillation of Lisa’s 
Lyme positive belief probability begins around the 
same time as in the case of 0.85; however, as shown 
in Figure 7 temporal oscillation continues, which 
means that metal (ontic) uncertainty continues. This 
means that Lisa’s inability to diagnose her symptoms 
inflated Lisa’s anxiety, indecisiveness concerning the 






Figure 7. Temporal oscillation of probability of 
Lyme positive belief for Lisa; the initial probability is 
0.66. 
If the initial probabilistic difference increases to 
0.19 by increasing Lisa’s initial utility factor value to 
0.69, as shown in Figure 8 the temporal oscillation of 
Lisa’s Lyme positive belief probability begins earlier 
than the other two cases; the temporal oscillation 
continues such that Lisa will experience higher anxiety 
while interacting with the online content. 
 
 
Figure 8. Temporal oscillation of Lisa’s probability 
Lyme positive belief when the initial probability is 
0.69. 
3.4 Case 2: Webpage information content 
with random noise 
 
In case two, random noise was added to the 
probabilistic value of the content of the webpage that 
appears in the search results; in doing so, the goal is to 
see the effects of minute content variations in the 
visited webpages on Lisa’s belief probability.  These 
minute probabilistic variations are included with a 
random noise ∆= 0.01. As shown in Figure 9, temporal 
oscillations begin earlier than the case in which the 
visited web page's probabilistic representation does 
not vary. In the case of increasing Lisa’s utility factor 
to 0.66, temporal oscillation, as shown in Figure 10, 
begins quickly and oscillates with higher amplitude 
than the case shown in Figure 7; very small variations 




Figure 9. Temporal oscillation of probability of 
Lyme positive belief for Lisa; the initial probability is 
0.69.  
In the case of increasing Lisa’s utility factor to 0.69, 
the uncertainty increases, shown in Figure 11.  
 
 
Figure 10. Temporal oscillation of probability of 
Lyme positive belief for Lisa. 
To compare these human-machine/computer 
interaction scenarios with human-human interaction 
ones, each scenario is further studied by using 
Equation 14, for both agents are assumed to be 
humans. Suppose Lisa goes to a doctor after finding a 
tick on her leg without any online Lyme disease 
inquiry. To model these scenarios, the initial 
conditions are examined for two different 
interference factors. In the first case, both agents 
have positive interference factors; in the second case, 
Lisa has a positive interference term, and the doctor 
has a negative interference term. 
The positive interference term represents that 
number of patients that are diagnosed with Lyme 
positive is high; therefore, the doctor thinks that this 
case can be a Lyme positive case. 
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Figure 11. Temporal oscillation of probability of 
Lyme positive belief for Lisa. 
The negative interference term represents that 
although it is tick season, Lyme positive cases are rare 
in the area.  It is also assumed that since Lisa thinks 
she might have Lyme disease because she found a tick 
on her leg and her initial utility factor varies between 
0.65 and 0.69; since the doctor is natural before 
meeting with the patient, the doctor’s utility factor is 
0.5 in all of the cases. As shown in Figure 12, Lisa 
does not experience any temporal oscillation while 




Figure 12. Temporal oscillation of probability of 
Lyme positive belief both doctor and patient. The 
asymptotic behavior represents the mental stability of 
the agents. 
In the case of having initial disagreement due to the 
negative interference term of the doctor, both agents 
experience minute temporal oscillations (shown in 
Figure 13), then both agents' probabilistic 
understanding stabilizes to the initial utility values. 
A comparison of the oscillation range for different 
machine probability cases are further studied for 
changing probability differences between agents. As 
shown in Figure 14, as the probabilistic difference 
between human and machines increases, the temporal 
oscillation amplitude of the human probabilities 




Figure 13. Temporal oscillation of probability of 
Lyme positive belief for both doctor and patient. 
After both humans experience mental uncertainty, 
their mental uncertainty represents asymptotic 
behavior.
 
Figure 14. Temporal oscillation range (Max-
Min)[Probability of Lisa’s belief Lyme Positive] for 
different probabilistic differences between human 
and machine. 
The reason for observing a scaling at 0.2 is due to 
the predetermined interference term value of 0.2. The 
interesting observation is that as the noise in the 
machine’s probabilistic representation of information 
increases, the scaling is observed independently from 
the probabilistic difference. One interpretation of this 
observation is that as the search engine increases the 
amount of available information to the human 
decision-maker, he/she can start experiencing higher 
(ontic) mental uncertainty. In return, a human can 
desire to seek more information and find him/herself 
in an information echo chamber, which can inflate 
anxiety.  
4. Summary and Conclusion 
 
This paper is intended to show how decision-related 
uncertainty cannot be fully explained with classical 
probability theory.  It introduces the authors’ position 
on the limitation of classical probability approaches 
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for dealing with uncertainty.  The paper illustrates 
this with an approach that describes a situation based 
on a popular case study and applying mathematical 
foundations from known theories to highlight the 
limitations of classical probability theory.  This is 
followed by a discussion on how quantum probability 
theory improves the understanding of uncertainty; it 
is demonstrated with a scenario meant to highlight a 
decision process with high uncertainty to show how 
quantum probability theory highlights the impact of 
ontic uncertainty on the decision process.  The paper 
is meant as a position using accepted theory to 
introduce a new perspective rather than theoretical 
work.  It was not meant to apply a research 
methodology consisting of an experiment, capturing 
the relevant data, conducting analysis, and discussing 
the implications for introducing a new theory. In this 
paper, we modeled a situation in which an 
interdependency emerges between information 
exchanging decision-making human agents. We 
demonstrated that if a computer replaces one of the 
humans, the uncertainty that the remaining human 
experiences can increase. 
We demonstrated that human probabilistic 
decision-making measures (e.g., Lyme positive 
belief) are affected by the minute probabilistic 
variation of the information that is provided by a 
computer (machine). The limitations of narrow AI 
systems that can inadvertently constraint human 
behavior must be comprehensively studied. As 
demonstrated, by modeling Lisa’s situation with 
QPT, frenetic interactions with computers (machines) 
can have repercussions beyond the epistemic level. 
The findings of this paper are valid only for the 
situations in which humans interact with computers, 
search engines, and online information sources. The 
next step in this research is to study the dynamics of 
information exchange between a machine with more 
capabilities and humans in a goal-oriented 
environment; this will enable to study team dynamics 
such as coordination, communication, and 
interdependency with QPT.    
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